In some previous posts (e.g., here), I’ve looked at citations from the Web of Science XML (hereafer WoS) through mid-2022. I was hoping to get similar data for more recent years, but it seems that the price of that is prohibitive. Then I tried using OpenAlex for more recent data, but the quality of their data wasn’t quite what I needed, and matching the data to WoS proved impossible.
So I simply downloaded via the website three years of citation data for the 100 journals I’d been looking at. This still needed some work to match the new citations to the old citations - the website data didn’t include the WoS ID numbers for cited articles that I’ve been using for most purposes. But they did include DOIs, which covered about 90% of the citations, and by some other kinds of matching (e.g., any ‘two’ articles with the same journal name, journal volume, and first page number are probably identical, unless the journal is something like Imprint that restarts page numbers for every article) I got to I think about 98% of the citations.1 So I have something like citation data through 2024.2
1 I actually downloaded the website data for 2021, which I already had via the XML, and used the same techniques there to check how well it was doing.
2 Or, in cases like Canadian Journal of Philosophy which hasn’t yet published a 2024 edition, as recent as possible.
This post goes over some facts about those citations. (For this post I’m starting with data from 1965; the data before that are rather misleading because they don’t include so many journals, especially Analysis.)
First, the explosion in the number of articles published has levelled off. In fact because Synthese stopped publishing special issues, it actually declined. Figure 1 shows how many articles I have in the dataset each year, and Figure 2 is the same graph just with Synthese excluded.
The drop at the end of Figure 2 is largely from journals that either haven’t yet published their 2024 editions, or which are not going to publish a 2024 edition because of the move to open access.
The number of citations (to philosophy journals) per article has also somewhat stabilised, as shown in Figure 3.
The gap from 2020 to 2021 is so striking that if I had changed data sources between those two years, rather than between 2021 and 2022, I wouldn’t believe it was real. It’s possible the source I’m using post-2022 is slightly undercounting citations, which might be why we have the longest period where this statistic is flat since the late 1990s.
There are a lot more citations now, and possibly because of that, older articles are being cited much more frequently than before. In Figure 4, I plot how often the average article from different years is cited in 2020-2024.
The drop at the right side of Figure 4 is simply because some of those articles couldn’t possibly have been cited throughout 2020-2024 because they weren’t published.
The really striking parts of the graph are the period 2014-2019, and 2000-2013.
The period from 2014-2019 is a really long peak. If we did the same kind of graphs at different times in the past, it would have the same shape - a slow rise to a plateau, then a rapid falling off from articles that couldn’t have been cited throughout the period. But in general, the plateau would not be nearly this long. It’s really striking that articles that are 10 years old by the end of the period are being cited so much.
The thing to note about 2000-2013 is that the citation rates for every year in that period are above half the peak value reached in 2019. Again, if we did the same graph for previous five year periods, we typically would not see anything like that. The historical norm is that citation rates for earlier years are more like one-third or less the rate of the most cited year.
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| C. Thi Nguyen (2020) “Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles” | 107 | 107 |
| Renée Jorgensen Bolinger (2020) “The Rational Impermissibility of Accepting (Some) Racial Generalizations” | 58 | 59 |
| Jane Friedman (2020) “The Epistemic and the Zetetic” | 56 | 56 |
| Wendy S. Parker (2020) “Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-For-Purpose View” | 47 | 47 |
| Bob Beddor and Carlotta Pavese (2020) “Modal Virtue Epistemology” | 39 | 39 |
| Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2020) “Enkrasia or Evidentialism? Learning To Love Mismatch” | 37 | 37 |
| Kathleen A. Creel (2020) “Transparency in Complex Computational Systems” | 36 | 36 |
| Jenann Ismael and Jonathan Schaffer (2020) “Quantum Holism: Nonseparability as Common Ground” | 35 | 37 |
| Jessica Brown (2020) “What is Epistemic Blame?” | 34 | 34 |
| Carl F. Craver and David M. Kaplan (2020) “Are More Details Better? on the Norms of Completeness for Mechanistic Explanations” | 33 | 39 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Jane Friedman (2019) “Inquiry and Belief” | 88 | 90 |
| Rima Basu (2019a) “The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs” | 78 | 79 |
| Rima Basu (2019b) “What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other” | 61 | 62 |
| Kevin Dorst (2019) “Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy” | 49 | 51 |
| Fabrice Correia and Alexander Skiles (2019) “Grounding, Essence, and Identity” | 45 | 50 |
| Anna-Sofia Maurin (2019) “Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation: It’s Complicated” | 40 | 42 |
| Susanna Rinard (2019b) “Equal Treatment for Belief” | 35 | 35 |
| Chris Dorst (2019) “Towards a Best Predictive System Account of Laws of Nature” | 34 | 35 |
| Patrick Todd (2019) “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing To Blame” | 31 | 33 |
| Claudio Calosi and Jessica Wilson (2019) “Quantum Metaphysical Indeterminacy” | 31 | 31 |
| Susanna Rinard (2019a) “Believing for Practical Reasons” | 31 | 32 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Alastair Wilson (2018) “Metaphysical Causation” | 72 | 78 |
| Amia Srinivasan (2018) “The Aptness of Anger” | 57 | 60 |
| Alex Worsnip (2018) “The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence” | 56 | 68 |
| David J. Chalmers (2018) “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness” | 51 | 78 |
| Seth Yalcin (2018) “Belief as Question-Sensitive” | 49 | 51 |
| Jeremy Goodman and Bernhard Salow (2018) “Taking a Chance on KK” | 44 | 45 |
| Martin Smith (2018) “When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?” | 42 | 45 |
| Barry Maguire (2018) “There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes” | 41 | 46 |
| Francesco Berto, Rohan French, Graham Priest, and Ellie Ripley (2018) “Williamson on Counterpossibles” | 39 | 42 |
| Selim Berker (2018) “The Unity of Grounding” | 39 | 47 |
| … | ||
| Jelle Bruineberg, Julian Kiverstein, and Erik Rietveld (2018) “The Anticipating Brain is Not a Scientist: The Free-Energy Principle From An Ecological-Enactive Perspective” | 36 | 45 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Jane Friedman (2017) “Why Suspend Judging?” | 94 | 101 |
| Jonathan Schaffer (2017) “The Ground Between the Gaps” | 62 | 70 |
| Kit Fine (2017a) “A Theory of Truthmaker Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction and Negation” | 60 | 67 |
| Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2017) “Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic” | 57 | 65 |
| Sarah-Jane Leslie (2017) “The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization” | 53 | 61 |
| Regina Rini (2017) “Fake News and Partisan Epistemology” | 51 | 54 |
| Susanna Rinard (2017) “No Exception for Belief” | 49 | 59 |
| Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder (2017) “Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations” | 48 | 62 |
| Amie L. Thomasson (2017) “Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation” | 46 | 53 |
| Kit Fine (2017b) “A Theory of Truthmaker Content II: Subject-Matter, Common Content, Remainder and Ground” | 42 | 46 |
| … | ||
| Martin Glazier (2017) “Essentialist Explanation” | 41 | 49 |
| Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2017) “Skill” | 36 | 49 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Jonathan Schaffer (2016) “Grounding in the Image of Causation” | 151 | 207 |
| Alison Hills (2016) “Understanding Why” | 100 | 114 |
| Cian Dorr (2016) “To Be F is To Be G” | 97 | 114 |
| Miranda Fricker (2016) “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation” | 71 | 89 |
| John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild, and Levi Spectre (2016) “Belief is Weak” | 66 | 84 |
| Katharine Jenkins (2016) “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman” | 64 | 78 |
| Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way (2016) “Fittingness First” | 64 | 85 |
| Sally Haslanger (2016) “What is a (Social) Structural Explanation?” | 61 | 82 |
| Kit Fine (2016) “Angellic Content” | 58 | 77 |
| Eric Mandelbaum (2016) “Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias” | 57 | 90 |
| … | ||
| Shamik Dasgupta (2016) “Metaphysical Rationalism” | 55 | 85 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Alexander Skiles (2015) “Against Grounding Necessitarianism” | 91 | 137 |
| Michael J. Raven (2015) “Ground” | 59 | 89 |
| James Woodward (2015) “Interventionism and Causal Exclusion” | 59 | 79 |
| Kristen Intemann (2015) “Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling” | 55 | 62 |
| David Plunkett (2015) “Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and the Methodology of Philosophy” | 55 | 65 |
| John Bengson (2015) “The Intellectual Given” | 47 | 67 |
| Johann Frick (2015) “Contractualism and Social Risk” | 46 | 61 |
| Jonathan Schaffer (2015) “What Not To Multiply Without Necessity” | 42 | 59 |
| Eduardo Barrio, Lucas Rosenblatt, and Diego Tajer (2015) “The Logics of Strict-Tolerant Logic” | 42 | 44 |
| Matthew H. Slater (2015) “Natural Kindness” | 41 | 60 |
| … | ||
| Collin Rice (2015) “Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation” | 31 | 64 |
| Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) “Grounding is Not a Strict Order” | 38 | 60 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Jessica M. Wilson (2014) “No Work for a Theory of Grounding” | 137 | 219 |
| Shamik Dasgupta (2014) “The Possibility of Physicalism” | 99 | 147 |
| Lara Buchak (2014) “Belief, Credence, and Norms” | 89 | 122 |
| Miriam Schoenfield (2014) “Permission To Believe: Why Permissivism is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief” | 87 | 144 |
| Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) “Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat” | 85 | 131 |
| Paul A. Boghossian (2014) “What is Inference?” | 84 | 124 |
| Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (2014) “Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment” | 83 | 131 |
| Sophie Horowitz (2014) “Epistemic Akrasia” | 80 | 126 |
| Kristie Dotson (2014) “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression” | 77 | 94 |
| Niko Kolodny (2014) “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy” | 63 | 79 |
| … | ||
| Robert W. Batterman and Collin C. Rice (2014) “Minimal Model Explanations” | 59 | 109 |
| Stephan Leuenberger (2014) “Grounding and Necessity” | 56 | 96 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Plunkett and Tim Sundell (2013) “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms” | 123 | 175 |
| Jane Friedman (2013b) “Suspended Judgment” | 77 | 100 |
| Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egre, Ellie Ripley, and Robert Van Rooij (2013) “Reaching Transparent Truth” | 65 | 79 |
| Ellie Ripley (2013) “Paradoxes and Failures of Cut” | 63 | 89 |
| Jane Friedman (2013a) “Question-Directed Attitudes” | 63 | 59 |
| Gregor Betz (2013) “In Defence of the Value Free Ideal” | 53 | 56 |
| Selim Berker (2013) “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions” | 52 | 81 |
| Kelly Trogdon (2013) “Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?” | 51 | 96 |
| Torsten Wilholt (2013) “Epistemic Trust in Science” | 50 | 48 |
| Roger Clarke (2013) “Belief is Credence One (In Context)” | 48 | 71 |
| … | ||
| Louis deRosset (2013) “Grounding Explanations” | 43 | 94 |
| Marc Lange (2013) “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” | 47 | 88 |
| Michael Strevens (2013) “No Understanding Without Explanation” | 45 | 75 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Paul Audi (2012) “Grounding: Toward a Theory of the In-Virtue-Of Relation” | 118 | 154 |
| Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. (2012) “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance” | 108 | 90 |
| Duncan Pritchard (2012) “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology” | 104 | 163 |
| Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egre, Ellie Ripley, and Robert Van Rooij (2012) “Tolerant, Classical, Strict” | 74 | 83 |
| Barry Loewer (2012) “Two Accounts of Laws and Time” | 72 | 82 |
| Elizabeth S. Anderson (2012) “Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions” | 68 | 74 |
| David Enoch, Levi Spectre, and Talia Fisher (2012) “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge” | 56 | 55 |
| Phyllis McKay Illari and Jon Williamson (2012) “What is a Mechanism? Thinking About Mechanisms Across the Sciences” | 55 | 70 |
| Ellie Ripley (2012) “Conservatively Extending Classical Logic With Transparent Truth” | 52 | 62 |
| Declan Smithies (2012) “Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification” | 46 | 75 |
| … | ||
| Fiona Macpherson (2012) “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of An Indirect Mechanism” | 45 | 89 |
| Eric Schwitzgebel and Fiery Cushman (2012) “Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers” | 45 | 83 |
| Kit Fine (2012) “The Pure Logic of Ground” | 44 | 76 |
| Susanna Siegel (2012) “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” | 39 | 75 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Kristie Dotson (2011) “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing” | 172 | 111 |
| Tamar Szabò Gendler (2011) “On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias” | 69 | 54 |
| David J. Chalmers (2011) “Verbal Disputes” | 65 | 86 |
| Karen Bennett (2011) “By Our Bootstraps” | 61 | 98 |
| Alisa Bokulich (2011) “How Scientific Models Can Explain” | 60 | 71 |
| Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver (2011) “Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches” | 56 | 77 |
| Benjamin Schnieder (2011) “A Logic for ‘Because’” | 55 | 63 |
| C. S. Jenkins (2011) “Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?” | 53 | 86 |
| David Michael Kaplan and Carl F. Craver (2011) “The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective” | 51 | 89 |
| Michael Pace (2011) “The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’” | 47 | 28 |
| … | ||
| David Christensen (2011) “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism” | 26 | 89 |
| Guy Kahane (2011) “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments” | 38 | 75 |
| Timothy Sundell (2011) “Disagreements About Taste” | 36 | 72 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Jonathan Schaffer (2010a) “Monism: The Priority of the Whole” | 167 | 215 |
| David Christensen (2010) “Higher-Order Evidence” | 102 | 85 |
| Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) “Unreasonable Knowledge” | 79 | 56 |
| James Woodward (2010) “Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation” | 74 | 87 |
| Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010) “The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity” | 69 | 59 |
| Julia Markovits (2010) “Acting for the Right Reasons” | 67 | 64 |
| Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane (2010) “Ifs and Oughts” | 61 | 95 |
| Roman Frigg (2010) “Models and Fiction” | 51 | 45 |
| Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew (2010) “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy” | 49 | 56 |
| James M. Joyce (2010) “A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making” | 49 | 66 |
| … | ||
| Eric Schwitzgebel (2010) “Acting Contrary To Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief” | 38 | 78 |
| Jonathan Schaffer (2010b) “The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker” | 32 | 75 |
| John Turri (2010) “On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification” | 41 | 73 |
| David Enoch (2010) “The Epistemological Challenge To Metanormative Realism: How Best To Understand It, and How To Cope With It” | 30 | 68 |
| A. John Simmons (2010) “Ideal and Nonideal Theory” | 24 | 66 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Alison Hills (2009) “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology” | 97 | 62 |
| Jonathan Cohen and Craig Callender (2009) “A Better Best System Account of Lawhood” | 51 | 41 |
| Christian List and Peter Menzies (2009) “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle” | 45 | 49 |
| Alan Baker (2009) “Mathematical Explanation in Science” | 43 | 53 |
| Michael Weisberg and Ryan Muldoon (2009) “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor” | 42 | 43 |
| Jonathan Schaffer (2009) “Spacetime the One Substance” | 39 | 46 |
| Paul Humphreys (2009) “The Philosophical Novelty of Computer Simulation Methods” | 39 | 16 |
| Christopher Hitchcock and Joshua Knobe (2009) “Cause and Norm” | 39 | 43 |
| Carl F. Craver (2009) “Mechanisms and Natural Kinds” | 39 | 33 |
| Don Fallis (2009) “What is Lying?” | 38 | 28 |
| Duncan Pritchard (2009) “Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?” | 38 | 35 |
| … | ||
| John MacFarlane (2009) “Nonindexical Contextualism” | 21 | 70 |
| Alex Byrne (2009) “Experience and Content” | 32 | 57 |
| Mark Schroeder (2009) “Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons” | 26 | 52 |
| Jonathan Quong (2009) “Killing in Self-Defense” | 10 | 49 |
| Tim Bayne (2009) “Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content” | 37 | 47 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (2008) “Knowledge and Action” | 132 | 142 |
| Tamar Szabò Gendler (2008a) “Alief and Belief” | 79 | 114 |
| Eric Schwitzgebel (2008) “The Unreliability of Naive Introspection” | 58 | 61 |
| Pamela Hieronymi (2008) “Responsibility for Believing” | 55 | 45 |
| Scott Sturgeon (2008) “Reason and the Grain of Belief” | 50 | 46 |
| Sarah-Jane Leslie (2008) “Generics: Cognition and Acquisition” | 50 | 34 |
| Jessica Brown (2008) “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning” | 49 | 46 |
| David Manley and Ryan Wasserman (2008) “On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals” | 46 | 45 |
| Kieran Setiya (2008) “Practical Knowledge” | 42 | 31 |
| Christopher Hom (2008) “The Semantics of Racial Epithets” | 39 | 29 |
| … | ||
| Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan M. Weinberg (2008) “The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp” | 23 | 76 |
| Tamar Szabò Gendler (2008b) “Alief in Action (And Reaction)” | 29 | 60 |
| Michael Fara (2008) “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism” | 32 | 60 |
| Ross P. Cameron (2008) “Turtles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality” | 36 | 56 |
| Kai Von Fintel and Anthony S. Gillies (2008) “CIA Leaks” | 18 | 49 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Adam Elga (2007) “Reflection and Disagreement” | 122 | 150 |
| David Christensen (2007) “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News” | 118 | 142 |
| Seth Yalcin (2007) “Epistemic Modals” | 94 | 75 |
| Jennifer Lackey (2007) “Norms of Assertion” | 79 | 96 |
| Michael Weisberg (2007) “Three Kinds of Idealization” | 69 | 63 |
| Christopher Kennedy (2007) “Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and Absolute Gradable Adjectives” | 64 | 63 |
| Michael Huemer (2007) “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” | 60 | 77 |
| Catherine Elgin (2007) “Understanding and the Facts” | 49 | 28 |
| Duncan Pritchard (2007) “Anti-Luck Epistemology” | 49 | 63 |
| Kevin J. S. Zollman (2007) “The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities” | 47 | 26 |
| … | ||
| Andy Egan (2007) “Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion” | 30 | 76 |
| John MacFarlane (2007) “Relativism and Disagreement” | 30 | 74 |
| Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe (2007) “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions” | 25 | 73 |
| Tamina Stephenson (2007) “Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predicates of Personal Taste” | 38 | 68 |
| Ernest Sosa (2007) “Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition” | 11 | 65 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Sharon Street (2006) “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” | 109 | 91 |
| Hilary Greaves and David Wallace (2006) “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility” | 92 | 35 |
| Sarah Stroud (2006) “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship” | 68 | 22 |
| Nishi Shah (2006) “A New Argument for Evidentialism” | 59 | 36 |
| Pamela Hieronymi (2006) “Controlling Attitudes” | 56 | 44 |
| Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) “The Strategy of Model-Based Science” | 56 | 57 |
| Stephen R. Grimm (2006) “Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?” | 55 | 33 |
| Galen Strawson (2006) “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism” | 53 | 39 |
| Igor Douven (2006) “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility” | 45 | 64 |
| Robert C. Stalnaker (2006) “On Logics of Knowledge and Belief” | 42 | 16 |
| … | ||
| Roger White (2006) “Problems for Dogmatism” | 37 | 69 |
| Carl F. Craver (2006) “When Mechanistic Models Explain” | 41 | 53 |
| Bill Brewer (2006) “Perception and Content” | 26 | 50 |
| David Enoch (2006) “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come From What is Constitutive of Action” | 34 | 47 |
| Joshua Knobe (2006) “The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology” | 10 | 46 |
| Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner (2006) “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?” | 11 | 43 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Nishi Shah and J. David Velleman (2005) “Doxastic Deliberation” | 109 | 64 |
| Niko Kolodny (2005) “Why Be Rational?” | 102 | 94 |
| Pamela Hieronymi (2005) “The Wrong Kind of Reason” | 81 | 40 |
| Angela M. Smith (2005) “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life” | 74 | 52 |
| Alan Baker (2005) “Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?” | 57 | 39 |
| Timothy Williamson (2005) “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge” | 52 | 48 |
| Peter Lasersohn (2005) “Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste” | 49 | 76 |
| Joseph Y. Halpern and Judea Pearl (2005) “Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes” | 47 | 32 |
| Matthew Weiner (2005) “Must We Know What We Say?” | 45 | 66 |
| HW De Regt and D Dieks (2005) “A Contextual Approach To Scientific Understanding” | 40 | 32 |
| … | ||
| Jonathan Schaffer (2005) “Contrastive Causation” | 37 | 44 |
| Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner (2005) “Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility” | 18 | 42 |
| Michael Fara (2005) “Dispositions and Habituals” | 22 | 40 |
| Keith DeRose (2005) “The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism” | 9 | 40 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Michael G. F. Martin (2004) “The Limits of Self-Awareness” | 76 | 47 |
| Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004) “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value” | 58 | 78 |
| Ronald N. Giere (2004) “How Models Are Used To Represent Reality” | 56 | 34 |
| Charles Travis (2004) “The Silence of the Senses” | 53 | 65 |
| David Pitt (2004) “The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What is It Like To Think That P?” | 44 | 56 |
| Mauricio Suárez (2004) “An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation” | 43 | 31 |
| Mark Johnston (2004) “The Obscure Object of Hallucination” | 42 | 37 |
| Robert D. Rupert (2004) “Challenges To the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition” | 38 | 41 |
| Galen Strawson (2004) “Against Narrativity” | 38 | 34 |
| David J. Chalmers (2004) “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics” | 36 | 41 |
| … | ||
| Jonathan Schaffer (2004) “From Contextualism To Contrastivism” | 14 | 41 |
| Mark Richard (2004) “Contextualism and Relativism” | 13 | 41 |
| Jeff McMahan (2004) “The Ethics of Killing in War” | 18 | 37 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Keith DeRose (2003) “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context” | 76 | 83 |
| Thomas Kelly (2003) “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique” | 62 | 32 |
| Nishi Shah (2003) “How Truth Governs Belief” | 56 | 48 |
| Tyler Burge (2003) “Perceptual Entitlement” | 50 | 47 |
| Alan Hájek (2003) “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be” | 49 | 46 |
| Niko Kolodny (2003) “Love as Valuing a Relationship” | 49 | 22 |
| Michael Strevens (2003) “The Role of the Priority Rule in Science” | 48 | 16 |
| Joshua Knobe (2003a) “Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language” | 47 | 76 |
| Samuel Scheffler (2003) “What is Egalitarianism?” | 38 | 47 |
| Katherine Hawley (2003) “Success and Knowledge-How” | 37 | 11 |
| … | ||
| John MacFarlane (2003) “Future Contingents and Relative Truth” | 36 | 52 |
| Kit Fine (2003) “The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter” | 27 | 49 |
| Jonathan Schaffer (2003) “Is There a Fundamental Level?” | 31 | 44 |
| Joshua Knobe (2003b) “Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation” | 20 | 40 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Robert C. Stalnaker (2002) “Common Ground” | 117 | 21 |
| Michael G. F. Martin (2002) “The Transparency of Experience” | 99 | 53 |
| Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (2002) “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification” | 93 | 44 |
| Ruth Chang (2002) “The Possibility of Parity” | 73 | 27 |
| Stuart Glennan (2002) “Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation” | 52 | 61 |
| Chris Barker (2002) “The Dynamics of Vagueness” | 51 | 10 |
| Eric Schwitzgebel (2002) “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief” | 49 | 21 |
| Thomas Kelly (2002) “The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes” | 43 | 17 |
| Alvin I. Goldman (2002) “Precis of ‘Knowledge in a Social World’” | 39 | 0 |
| Michael Tye (2002) “Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience” | 36 | 21 |
| … | ||
| Mohan Matthen and André Ariew (2002) “Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and Natural Selection” | 17 | 46 |
| Christian List and Philip Pettit (2002) “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result” | 19 | 45 |
| Stewart Cohen (2002) “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge” | 29 | 44 |
| Crispin Wright (2002) “(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell” | 25 | 44 |
| Denis M. Walsh, Tim Lewens, and André Ariew (2002) “The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift” | 17 | 39 |
| C Gillett (2002) “The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View” | 16 | 34 |
| François Recanati (2002) “Unarticulated Constituents” | 9 | 31 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) “Knowing How” | 117 | 66 |
| Alvin I. Goldman (2001) “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?” | 109 | 16 |
| Christopher Hitchcock (2001) “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs” | 58 | 35 |
| Alex Byrne (2001) “Intentionalism Defended” | 52 | 64 |
| Pamela Hieronymi (2001) “Articulating An Uncompromising Forgiveness” | 46 | 14 |
| David J. Chalmers and Frank Jackson (2001) “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation” | 44 | 69 |
| Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2001) “The Bounds of Cognition” | 39 | 28 |
| Mark Johnston (2001) “The Authority of Affect” | 37 | 10 |
| Amy Kind (2001) “Putting the Image Back in Imagination” | 35 | 3 |
| Carl F. Craver (2001) “Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy” | 32 | 40 |
| … | ||
| Christopher Peacocke (2001) “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?” | 19 | 50 |
| Patrick Rysiew (2001) “The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions” | 19 | 40 |
| David Lewis (2001a) “Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga” | 14 | 32 |
| Lenny Clapp (2001) “Disjunctive Properties: Multiple Realizations” | 25 | 30 |
| David Lewis (2001b) “Truthmaking and Difference-Making” | 25 | 29 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Sally Haslanger (2000) “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?” | 204 | 11 |
| Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. Craver (2000) “Thinking About Mechanisms” | 182 | 107 |
| James Pryor (2000) “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist” | 137 | 58 |
| Justin D’Arms and Dan Jacobson (2000) “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions” | 120 | 25 |
| Heather Douglas (2000) “Inductive Risk and Values in Science” | 106 | 8 |
| David Lewis (2000) “Causation as Influence” | 74 | 63 |
| Richard Feldman (2000) “The Ethics of Belief” | 73 | 24 |
| Tamar Szabò Gendler (2000) “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance” | 65 | 25 |
| Ian Rumfitt (2000) ““Yes” and “No”” | 52 | 9 |
| Jason Stanley and Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2000) “On Quantifier Domain Restriction” | 50 | 75 |
| … | ||
| Jason Stanley (2000) “Context and Logical Form” | 29 | 62 |
| Adam Elga (2000) “Self-Locating Belief and the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ Problem” | 27 | 43 |
| Richard Kimberly Heck (2000) “Nonconceptual Content and the ‘Space of Reasons’” | 28 | 39 |
| Lawrence A. Shapiro (2000) “Multiple Realizations” | 20 | 37 |
| James Woodward (2000) “Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences” | 12 | 29 |
| Kent Bach (2000) “Quantification, Qualification and Context: A Reply To Stanley and Szabò” | 4 | 29 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Elizabeth S. Anderson (1999) “What is the Point of Equality?” | 143 | 78 |
| John Broome (1999) “Normative Requirements” | 49 | 35 |
| BL Keeley (1999) “Of Conspiracy Theories” | 39 | 8 |
| John Hyman (1999) “How Knowledge Works” | 39 | 11 |
| J. David Velleman (1999) “Love as a Moral Emotion” | 38 | 18 |
| Jessica Wilson (1999) “How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need To Be?” | 32 | 4 |
| Jennifer Lackey (1999) “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission” | 31 | 25 |
| Rae Langton and Caroline West (1999) “Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game” | 31 | 7 |
| Karen Jones (1999) “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge (Ethics, Trust)” | 30 | 12 |
| Ruth Garrett Millikan (1999) “Historical Kinds and the”Special Sciences”” | 29 | 18 |
| Brandon Fitelson (1999) “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity” | 29 | 26 |
| … | ||
| Ned Block and Robert C. Stalnaker (1999) “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap” | 27 | 57 |
| Jaegwon Kim (1999) “Making Sense of Emergence” | 23 | 48 |
| William Bechtal and Jennifer Mundale (1999) “Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States” | 21 | 38 |
| Tomoji Shogenji (1999) “Is Coherence Truth Conducive?” | 9 | 36 |
| John Martin Fischer (1999) “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility” | 7 | 33 |
| David J. Chalmers (1999) “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality” | 6 | 31 |
| Elliot Sober (1999) “The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism” | 17 | 27 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers (1998) “The Extended Mind” | 186 | 43 |
| James M. Joyce (1998) “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism” | 131 | 10 |
| Peter van Inwagen (1998) “Modal Epistemology” | 53 | 5 |
| Nathan Salmon (1998) “Nonexistence” | 51 | 33 |
| James Ladyman (1998) “What is Structural Realism?” | 47 | 28 |
| Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (1998) “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism” | 36 | 17 |
| Alexander Bird (1998) “Dispositions and Antidotes” | 36 | 36 |
| Rae Langton and David Lewis (1998) “Defining ‘Intrinsic’” | 32 | 42 |
| Jonathan Wolff (1998) “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos” | 28 | 14 |
| Judith Jarvis Thomson (1998) “The Statue and the Clay” | 27 | 38 |
| Stuart Rachels (1998) “Counterexamples To the Transitivity of ‘Better-Than’” | 27 | 10 |
| … | ||
| John McDowell (1998) “Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality: Lecture I: Sellars on Perceptual Experience” | 8 | 29 |
| Sydney Shoemaker (1998) “Causal and Metaphysical Necessity” | 20 | 27 |
| Alfred R. Mele and David Robb (1998) “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases” | 9 | 25 |
| Ned Markosian (1998) “Brutal Composition” | 21 | 23 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1997a) “Finkish Dispositions” | 61 | 39 |
| Derek Parfit (1997) “Equality and Priority” | 52 | 16 |
| R. M. Sainsbury (1997) “Easy Possibilities” | 32 | 9 |
| Friedrich Steinle (1997) “Entering New Fields: Exploratory Uses of Experimentation” | 26 | 5 |
| Michael J. Zimmerman (1997) “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance” | 26 | 4 |
| R. I. G. Hughes (1997) “Models and Representation” | 25 | 6 |
| Robert Audi (1997) “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification” | 23 | 25 |
| Susan Wolf (1997) “Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life” | 23 | 4 |
| Alastair Norcross (1997) “Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives” | 23 | 10 |
| Daniel Nolan (1997) “Quantitative Parsimony” | 21 | 5 |
| … | ||
| Lynne Rudder Baker (1997) “Why Constitution is Not Identity” | 19 | 24 |
| Theodore Sider (1997) “Four Dimensionalism” | 11 | 24 |
| Tyler Burge (1997) “Interlocution, Perception, and Memory” | 15 | 22 |
| Michael Smith (1997) “In Defense of the Moral Problem: A Reply” | 3 | 21 |
| Christopher S. Hill (1997) “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem” | 11 | 19 |
| C. B. Martin (1997) “On the Need for Properties: The Road To Pythagoreanism and Back” | 20 | 18 |
| David Robb (1997) “The Properties of Mental Causation” | 3 | 17 |
| Guy Axtell (1997) “Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology” | 15 | 17 |
| Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore (1997) “Varieties of Quotation” | 2 | 17 |
| David Lewis (1997b) “Naming the Colours” | 15 | 17 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1996) “Elusive Knowledge” | 163 | 106 |
| Karen Jones (1996) “Trust as An Affective Attitude” | 81 | 6 |
| Timothy Williamson (1996) “Knowing and Asserting” | 81 | 22 |
| Frank Veltman (1996) “Defaults in Update Semantics” | 60 | 10 |
| Paul A. Boghossian (1996) “Analyticity Reconsidered” | 44 | 12 |
| Timothy Smiley (1996) “Rejection” | 39 | 6 |
| Ronald Dworkin (1996) “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It” | 34 | 19 |
| Noël Carroll (1996) “Moderate Moralism” | 23 | 13 |
| Larry S. Temkin (1996) “A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity” | 23 | 13 |
| David J. Chalmers (1996) “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?” | 23 | 11 |
| … | ||
| Donald Davidson (1996) “The Folly of Trying To Define Truth” | 10 | 29 |
| Kim Sterelny, KC Smith, and M Dickison (1996) “The Extended Replicator” | 3 | 23 |
| G. Y. Sher (1996) “Did Tarski Commit ‘’Tarski’s Fallacy’’?” | 9 | 22 |
| Alex Oliver (1996) “The Metaphysics of Properties” | 15 | 19 |
| Theodore Sider (1996) “All the World’s a Stage” | 16 | 19 |
| Colin McGinn (1996) “Another Look At Color” | 18 | 18 |
| J. David Velleman (1996) “The Possibility of Practical Reason” | 11 | 17 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Keith DeRose (1995) “Solving the Skeptical Problem” | 65 | 72 |
| Dorothy Edgington (1995) “On Conditionals” | 63 | 29 |
| Tim van Gelder (1995) “What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation” | 37 | 20 |
| Martha C. Nussbaum (1995) “Objectification” | 34 | 3 |
| Noam Chomsky (1995) “Language and Nature” | 27 | 27 |
| Karen Neander (1995) “Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning” | 27 | 27 |
| Tim Maudlin (1995) “Three Measurement Problems” | 26 | 0 |
| Kit Fine (1995) “The Logic of Essence” | 26 | 4 |
| Vann McGee and B Mclaughlin (1995) “Distinctions Without a Difference” | 25 | 3 |
| Charles Pigden (1995) “Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories” | 23 | 1 |
| … | ||
| Dean W. Zimmerman (1995) “Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution” | 9 | 34 |
| Paul Pietroski and Georges Rey (1995) “When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws From Vacuity” | 12 | 25 |
| Jessica Brown (1995) “The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access” | 4 | 23 |
| David Widerker (1995) “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities” | 8 | 23 |
| Bas C. van Fraassen (1995) “Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens” | 10 | 21 |
| Trenton Merricks (1995) “On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities” | 9 | 20 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1994) “Humean Supervenience Debugged” | 113 | 41 |
| Richard Holton (1994) “Deciding To Trust, Coming To Believe” | 60 | 7 |
| C. B. Martin (1994) “Dispositions and Conditionals” | 53 | 31 |
| Galen Strawson (1994) “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility” | 48 | 12 |
| Hartry Field (1994) “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” | 42 | 40 |
| Malcom Forster and Elliot Sober (1994) “How To Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions” | 41 | 39 |
| Linda Zagzebski (1994) “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems” | 39 | 5 |
| Robert Audi (1994) “Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions To Believe” | 37 | 7 |
| Peter Godfrey-Smith (1994) “A Modern History Theory of Functions” | 35 | 24 |
| Ned Hall (1994) “Correcting the Guide To Objective Chance” | 32 | 10 |
| … | ||
| Hilary Putnam (1994) “Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind” | 10 | 40 |
| Paul E. Griffiths and R. D. Gray (1994) “Developmental Systems and Evolutionary Explanation” | 14 | 35 |
| Michael B. Burke (1994) “Preserving the Principle of One Object To a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistance Conditions” | 11 | 33 |
| Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens (1994) “Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism” | 5 | 29 |
| Wesley C. Salmon (1994) “Causality Without Counterfactuals” | 10 | 26 |
| Ron Amundson and George V. Lauder (1994) “Function Without Purpose: The Uses of Causal Role Function in Evolutionary Biology” | 17 | 26 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Rae Langton (1993) “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts” | 89 | 7 |
| Stephen Yablo (1993a) “Is Conceivability a Guide To Possibility” | 77 | 19 |
| Tyler Burge (1993) “Content Preservation” | 69 | 58 |
| Daniel C. Dennett (1993) “The Message is: There is No Medium” | 68 | 6 |
| David Braun (1993) “Empty Names” | 29 | 10 |
| Stephen Yablo (1993b) “Paradox Without Self-Reference” | 27 | 19 |
| Paul E. Griffiths (1993) “Functional Analysis and Proper Functions” | 27 | 17 |
| Peter Menzies and Huw Price (1993) “Causation as a Secondary Quality” | 26 | 9 |
| Michael E. Bratman (1993) “Shared Intention” | 24 | 5 |
| Hilary Kornblith (1993) “Epistemic Normativity” | 21 | 11 |
| Peter Godfrey-Smith (1993) “Functions: Consensus Without Unity” | 21 | 11 |
| … | ||
| Fred Dretske (1993) “Conscious Experience” | 13 | 26 |
| Richard K. Larson and Peter Ludlow (1993) “Interpreted Logical Forms” | 4 | 21 |
| Paul Horwich (1993) “Gibbard Theory of Norms” | 2 | 15 |
| Liam B. Murphy (1993) “The Demands of Beneficence” | 8 | 15 |
| Jeremy Waldron (1993) “Special Ties and Natural Duties” | 8 | 13 |
| Geoffrey Nunberg (1993) “Indexicality and Deixis” | 17 | 13 |
| Gideon Rosen (1993) “A Problem for Fictionalism About Possible Worlds” | 0 | 13 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Stephen Yablo (1992) “Mental Causation” | 90 | 52 |
| Keith DeRose (1992) “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” | 82 | 12 |
| Mark Johnston (1992b) “How To Speak of the Colors” | 69 | 31 |
| Michael E. Bratman (1992b) “Shared Cooperative Activity” | 38 | 5 |
| Jaegwon Kim (1992) “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction” | 35 | 27 |
| Michael E. Bratman (1992a) “Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context” | 32 | 6 |
| Julia Driver (1992) “The Suberogatory” | 32 | 2 |
| Richard Foley (1992) “The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief” | 29 | 5 |
| J. David Velleman (1992b) “What Happens When Someone Acts” | 26 | 6 |
| J. David Velleman (1992a) “The Guise of the Good” | 25 | 7 |
| … | ||
| Philip Kitcher (1992) “The Naturalists Return” | 17 | 28 |
| Michael B. Burke (1992) “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge To the Standard Account” | 7 | 26 |
| Stephen Schiffer (1992) “Belief Ascription” | 14 | 25 |
| Anthony Brueckner (1992) “What An Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori” | 2 | 24 |
| Mark Johnston (1992a) “Constitution is Not Identity” | 13 | 20 |
| Phil Dowe (1992) “Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory” | 13 | 17 |
| Francis Egan (1992) “Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content” | 6 | 17 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Daniel C. Dennett (1991) “Real Patterns” | 93 | 30 |
| Richard Boyd (1991) “Realism, Anti-foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds” | 70 | 9 |
| Karen Neander (1991a) “Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense” | 67 | 44 |
| Frank Jackson (1991) “Decision-theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection” | 57 | 10 |
| John Hardwig (1991) “The Role of Trust in Knowledge” | 52 | 10 |
| Solomon Feferman (1991) “Reflecting on Incompleteness” | 38 | 12 |
| Chris Swoyer (1991) “Structural Representation and Surrogative Reasoning” | 37 | 7 |
| Judith Jarvis Thomson (1991) “Self-Defense” | 37 | 8 |
| J. David Velleman (1991) “Well-Being and Time” | 34 | 4 |
| Keith DeRose (1991) “Epistemic Possibilities” | 33 | 9 |
| … | ||
| Jeroen Groenendijk and Martin Stokhof (1991) “Dynamic Predicate Logic” | 28 | 26 |
| Jerry A. Fodor (1991) “A Modal Argument for Narrow Content” | 3 | 25 |
| Stephen Schiffer (1991) “Ceteris Paribus Laws” | 2 | 25 |
| Karen Neander (1991b) “The Teleological Notion of Function” | 25 | 24 |
| Michael McKinsey (1991) “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access” | 12 | 23 |
| John Martin Fischer and M Ravizza (1991) “Responsibility and Inevitability” | 2 | 19 |
| Francis Egan (1991) “Must Psychology Be Individualistic” | 2 | 19 |
| Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin (1991) “Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination” | 21 | 19 |
| Martin Davies (1991) “Individualism and Perceptual Content” | 4 | 19 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Philip Kitcher (1990) “The Division of Cognitive Labor” | 85 | 24 |
| Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1990) “Program Explanation: A General Perspective” | 37 | 19 |
| Huw Price (1990) “Why Not” | 21 | 6 |
| Jonathan Vogel (1990) “Cartesian Skepticism and Inference To the Best Explanation” | 20 | 8 |
| Warren S. Quinn (1990) “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer” | 18 | 4 |
| Irene Heim (1990) “E-Type Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora” | 18 | 9 |
| Jonathan Bennett (1990) “Why is Belief Involuntary” | 17 | 0 |
| Paul A. Boghossian (1990) “The Status of Content” | 17 | 20 |
| Jamie Dreier (1990) “Internalism and Speaker Relativism” | 17 | 10 |
| Larry Laudan (1990) “Normative Naturalism” | 15 | 18 |
| Thomas Scanlon (1990) “Promises and Practices” | 15 | 7 |
| … | ||
| Donald Davidson (1990) “The Structure and Content of Truth” | 11 | 44 |
| Tim Crane and D. H. Mellor (1990) “There is No Question of Physicalism” | 11 | 35 |
| Jaegwon Kim (1990) “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept” | 10 | 25 |
| Graeme Forbes (1990) “The Indispensability of Sinn” | 6 | 23 |
| Michael Tye (1990) “Vague Objects” | 6 | 22 |
| Gideon Rosen (1990) “Modal Fictionalism” | 13 | 21 |
| Peter van Inwagen (1990) “Four-Dimensional Objects” | 12 | 18 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Ruth Garrett Millikan (1989b) “In Defense of Proper Functions” | 66 | 40 |
| Ruth Garrett Millikan (1989a) “Biosemantics” | 66 | 39 |
| G. A. Cohen (1989) “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice” | 52 | 32 |
| Richard J. Arneson (1989) “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare” | 41 | 14 |
| L. J. Cohen (1989) “Belief and Acceptance” | 34 | 3 |
| Paul A. Boghossian (1989) “The Rule-Following Considerations” | 34 | 19 |
| Paul A. Boghossian and J. David Velleman (1989) “Color as a Secondary Quality” | 32 | 25 |
| Don Marquis (1989) “Why Abortion is Immoral” | 30 | 7 |
| Alison M. Jaggar (1989) “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology” | 26 | 4 |
| Mark Crimmins and John Perry (1989) “The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs” | 26 | 34 |
| … | ||
| Philip Pettit and R Sugden (1989) “The Backward Induction Paradox” | 2 | 20 |
| Gabriel Segal (1989) “Seeing What is Not There” | 3 | 19 |
| Warren S. Quinn (1989) “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect” | 19 | 16 |
| Colin McGinn (1989) “Can We Solve the Mind Body Problem” | 17 | 14 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| James Bogen and James Woodward (1988) “Saving the Phenomena” | 58 | 19 |
| Adam Grove (1988) “Two Modelings for Theory Change” | 28 | 7 |
| Tyler Burge (1988) “Individualism and Self-Knowledge” | 21 | 27 |
| Robert C. Roberts (1988) “What An Emotion is: A Sketch” | 19 | 10 |
| Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller (1988) “We-Intentions” | 19 | 5 |
| Shelley Kagan (1988) “The Additive Fallacy” | 19 | 11 |
| Penelope Maddy (1988) “Believing the Axioms (I)” | 18 | 14 |
| David Lewis (1988) “Desire as Belief” | 18 | 13 |
| D. L. M. Baxter (1988) “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense” | 18 | 4 |
| William P. Alston (1988) “An Internalist Externalism” | 16 | 7 |
| Peter J. Hammond (1988) “Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility” | 16 | 12 |
| Andrews Reath (1988) “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant” | 16 | 1 |
| … | ||
| Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1988) “Functionalism and Broad Content” | 7 | 34 |
| John Rawls (1988) “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good” | 12 | 27 |
| Kim Sterelny and Philip Kitcher (1988) “The Return of the Gene” | 8 | 21 |
| Mohan Matthen (1988) “Biological Functions and Perceptual Content” | 7 | 18 |
| Noël Carroll (1988) “Art, Practice, and Narrative” | 1 | 18 |
| David Albert and Barry Loewer (1988) “Interpreting the Many Worlds Interpretation” | 7 | 16 |
| Lawrence A. Blum (1988) “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory” | 0 | 15 |
| Quentin Smith (1988) “The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe” | 0 | 14 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Margaret Gilbert (1987) “Modeling Collective Belief” | 44 | 5 |
| Harry G. Frankfurt (1987) “Equality as a Moral Ideal” | 38 | 1 |
| John Earman and John Norton (1987) “What Price Spacetime Substantivalism: The Hole Story” | 32 | 21 |
| Michael Smith (1987) “The Humean Theory of Motivation” | 30 | 20 |
| John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter (1987) “Functions” | 29 | 23 |
| Dennis W. Stampe (1987) “The Authority of Desire” | 28 | 6 |
| Larry S. Temkin (1987) “Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox” | 22 | 4 |
| Stephen Yablo (1987) “Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility” | 17 | 11 |
| Brian Skyrms (1987) “Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics” | 15 | 6 |
| J. A. Montmarquet (1987) “Epistemic Virtue” | 15 | 2 |
| Judith Baker (1987) “Trust and Rationality” | 15 | 3 |
| … | ||
| Larry Laudan (1987) “Progress or Rationality: The Prospects for Normative Naturalism” | 7 | 29 |
| Thomas Nagel (1987) “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy” | 10 | 17 |
| Jaegwon Kim (1987) “Strong and Global Supervenience Revisited” | 5 | 15 |
| Ernest Lepore and Barry Loewer (1987) “Mind Matters” | 5 | 15 |
| Ken Binmore (1987) “Modeling Rational Players (I)” | 2 | 15 |
| Stephen Davies (1987) “Authenticity in Musical Performance” | 3 | 10 |
| J. Howard Sobel (1987) “Self-Doubts and Dutch Strategies” | 4 | 10 |
| Michael Friedman (1987) “Carnap’s Reconsidered” | 1 | 10 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Annette Baier (1986) “Trust and Antitrust” | 105 | 24 |
| Peter Railton (1986) “Moral Realism” | 51 | 37 |
| Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter (1986) “Oughts, Options, and Actualism” | 25 | 10 |
| Tyler Burge (1986b) “Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind” | 22 | 17 |
| David Lewis (1986) “Against Structural Universals” | 21 | 6 |
| David M. Rosenthal (1986) “Two Concepts of Consciousness” | 19 | 16 |
| Tyler Burge (1986a) “Individualism and Psychology” | 18 | 60 |
| Paul Teller (1986) “Relational Holism and Quantum-Mechanics” | 17 | 10 |
| Christine M. Korsgaard (1986) “Skepticism About Practical Reason” | 17 | 15 |
| William N. Reinhardt (1986) “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories With a Partial Predicate for Truth” | 17 | 4 |
| … | ||
| Ruth Garrett Millikan (1986) “Thoughts Without Laws, Cognitive Science With Content” | 2 | 23 |
| Anthony L. Brueckner (1986) “Brains in a Vat” | 2 | 17 |
| Howard Wettstein (1986) “Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake” | 7 | 14 |
| John Bacon (1986) “Supervenience, Necessary Coextension, and Reducibility” | 0 | 13 |
| Larry Laudan, Arthur Donovan,, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard, and Steve Wykstra (1986) “Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research” | 8 | 13 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| John Hardwig (1985) “Epistemic Dependence” | 71 | 10 |
| Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (1985) “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” | 60 | 24 |
| Richard Feldman and Earl Conee (1985) “Evidentialism” | 58 | 6 |
| Vann McGee (1985) “A Counterexample To Modus Ponens” | 53 | 8 |
| Ernan McMullin (1985) “Galilean Idealization” | 47 | 4 |
| George Boolos (1985) “Nominalist Platonism” | 32 | 10 |
| William P. Alston (1985) “Concepts of Epistemic Justification” | 22 | 17 |
| Robert Merrihew Adams (1985) “Involuntary Sins” | 21 | 4 |
| Dorothy Edgington (1985) “The Paradox of Knowability” | 18 | 13 |
| Isaac Levi (1985) “Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment” | 18 | 0 |
| … | ||
| John Rawls (1985) “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical” | 12 | 48 |
| Paul M. Churchland (1985) “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States” | 7 | 22 |
| Richard Feldman (1985) “Reliability and Justification” | 16 | 19 |
| Amartya Sen (1985) “Moral Information” | 9 | 17 |
| Terrence Horgan and James Woodward (1985) “Folk Psychology is Here To Stay” | 4 | 14 |
| Ronald N. Giere (1985) “Philosophy of Science Naturalized” | 5 | 12 |
| Warren Goldfarb (1985) “Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules” | 4 | 11 |
| Steven Buechler (1985) “The Geometry of Weakly Minimal Types” | 0 | 11 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1984) “Putnam’s Paradox” | 79 | 18 |
| Peter Railton (1984) “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” | 72 | 19 |
| George Boolos (1984) “To Be is To Be a Value of a Variable (Or To Be Some Values of Some Variables)” | 54 | 14 |
| Stewart Cohen (1984) “Justification and Truth” | 54 | 10 |
| Bas C. van Fraassen (1984) “Belief and the Will” | 53 | 21 |
| Michael E. Bratman (1984) “Two Faces of Intention” | 36 | 8 |
| Philip Kitcher (1984) “Species” | 29 | 18 |
| Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith (1984) “Truth-Makers” | 28 | 8 |
| Peter Schroeder-Heister (1984) “A Natural Extension of Natural Deduction” | 24 | 1 |
| David Papineau (1984) “Representation and Explanation” | 24 | 3 |
| … | ||
| Jaegwon Kim (1984) “Concepts of Supervenience” | 13 | 52 |
| Jerry A. Fodor (1984) “Observation Reconsidered” | 14 | 22 |
| Jon P. Jarrett (1984) “On the Physical Significance of the Locality Conditions in the Bell-Arguments” | 2 | 19 |
| Marcia Baron (1984) “The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting From Duty” | 6 | 18 |
| Jonathan Bennett (1984) “Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction” | 12 | 16 |
| Solomon Feferman (1984) “Toward Useful Type-Free Theories (I)” | 18 | 16 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1983b) “New Work for a Theory of Universals” | 327 | 45 |
| Christine M. Korsgaard (1983) “Two Distinctions in Goodness” | 58 | 6 |
| Joseph Levine (1983) “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap” | 50 | 3 |
| Robert Brandom (1983) “Asserting” | 44 | 6 |
| Gregory S. Kavka (1983) “The Toxin Puzzle” | 41 | 15 |
| David Lewis (1983a) “Extrinsic Properties” | 30 | 10 |
| Holly Smith (1983) “Culpable Ignorance” | 27 | 6 |
| Hilary Kornblith (1983) “Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action” | 26 | 21 |
| Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen (1983) “Justification, Truth, and Coherence” | 23 | 8 |
| Thomas Hurka (1983) “Value and Population Size” | 17 | 4 |
| Judith Jarvis Thomson (1983) “Parthood and Identity Across Time” | 17 | 7 |
| Alvin Plantinga (1983) “On Existentialism” | 17 | 8 |
| … | ||
| Ellery Eells and Elliot Sober (1983) “Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity” | 2 | 21 |
| Patricia S. Churchland and Paul M. Churchland (1983) “Stalking The Wild Epistemic Engine” | 0 | 15 |
| Patricia S. Churchland (1983) “Consciousness: The Transmutation of a Concept” | 3 | 14 |
| Philippa Foot (1983) “Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma” | 9 | 14 |
| Stewart Shapiro (1983) “Mathematics and Reality” | 4 | 14 |
| John Cottingham (1983) “Ethics and Impartiality” | 3 | 12 |
| Bruno Poizat (1983) “An Imaginary Galois Theory” | 0 | 11 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Frank Jackson (1982) “Epiphenomenal Qualia” | 122 | 25 |
| Susan Wolf (1982) “Moral Saints” | 47 | 18 |
| David Lewis (1982) “Logic for Equivocators” | 43 | 4 |
| Harry G. Frankfurt (1982) “The Importance of What We Care About” | 41 | 5 |
| Chris Swoyer (1982) “The Nature of Natural Laws” | 29 | 7 |
| Elizabeth W. Prior, Robert Pargetter, and Frank Jackson (1982) “Three Theses About Dispositions” | 23 | 10 |
| Derek Parfit (1982) “Future Generations: Further Problems” | 22 | 7 |
| Sydney Shoemaker (1982) “The Inverted Spectrum” | 18 | 11 |
| Gregory S. Kavka (1982) “The Paradox of Future Individuals” | 16 | 5 |
| Anil Gupta (1982) “Truth and Paradox” | 15 | 25 |
| Brian Skyrms (1982) “Causal Decision Theory” | 15 | 10 |
| Peter Gärdenfors (1982) “Imaging and Conditionalization” | 15 | 1 |
| Peter Gärdenfors and NE Sahlin (1982) “Unreliable Probabilities, Risk-Taking, and Decision-Making” | 15 | 5 |
| … | ||
| John Haugeland (1982) “Weak Supervenience” | 2 | 27 |
| Dudley Shapere (1982) “The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy” | 9 | 22 |
| Jaegwon Kim (1982) “Psychophysical Supervenience” | 7 | 20 |
| Terrence Horgan (1982) “Supervenience and Microphysics” | 3 | 19 |
| Amartya Sen (1982) “Rights and Agency” | 9 | 18 |
| Bas C. van Fraassen (1982) “The Charybdis of Realism: Epistemological Implications of Bells-Inequality” | 0 | 17 |
| Hans G. Herzberger (1982) “Notes on Naive Semantics” | 10 | 16 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1981) “Causal Decision Theory” | 70 | 35 |
| Philip Kitcher (1981) “Explanatory Unification” | 69 | 10 |
| Larry Laudan (1981) “A Confutation of Convergent Realism” | 64 | 26 |
| Paul M. Churchland (1981) “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes” | 57 | 57 |
| Jon Barwise and Robin Cooper (1981) “Generalized Quantifiers and Natural-Language” | 48 | 39 |
| Ronald Dworkin (1981b) “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources” | 48 | 25 |
| Peter van Inwagen (1981) “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts” | 25 | 4 |
| Peter Railton (1981) “Probability, Explanation, and Information” | 24 | 6 |
| Robert Merrihew Adams (1981) “Actualism and Thisness” | 22 | 10 |
| Ned Block (1981) “Psychologism and Behaviorism” | 21 | 7 |
| John Dupré (1981) “Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa” | 21 | 16 |
| Fred Dretske (1981) “The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge” | 21 | 8 |
| … | ||
| Ronald Dworkin (1981a) “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare” | 11 | 19 |
| William G. Lycan (1981) “Form, Function, and Feel” | 5 | 15 |
| Michael D. Resnik (1981) “Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Ontology and Reference” | 7 | 15 |
| Jon Barwise (1981) “Scenes and Other Situations” | 6 | 14 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Hilary Putnam (1980) “Models and Reality” | 43 | 21 |
| Jerrold Levinson (1980) “What a Musical Work Is” | 36 | 10 |
| Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone (1980) “Two Notions of Necessity” | 33 | 3 |
| John Rawls (1980) “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” | 29 | 55 |
| E Klein (1980) “A Semantics for Positive and Comparative Adjectives” | 24 | 5 |
| Ruth Barcan Marcus (1980) “Moral Dilemmas and Consistency” | 23 | 23 |
| David Lewis (1980) “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision” | 22 | 9 |
| Susan Wolf (1980) “Asymmetrical Freedom” | 17 | 4 |
| M Devitt (1980) “Ostrich Nominalism or Mirage Realism” | 14 | 5 |
| Elliot Sober (1980) “Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism” | 14 | 8 |
| … | ||
| Norman Daniels (1980) “Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points” | 8 | 22 |
| Patricia S. Churchland (1980) “A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research” | 0 | 19 |
| Stephen E. Boër and William G. Lycan (1980) “Who, Me?” | 3 | 19 |
| Ned Block (1980) “Are Absent Qualia Impossible” | 3 | 18 |
| Penelope Maddy (1980) “Perception and Mathematical Intuition” | 3 | 14 |
| Wesley C. Salmon (1980) “Probabilistic Causality” | 3 | 11 |
| Stephen P. Stich and RE Nisbett (1980) “Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning” | 2 | 11 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1979d) “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” | 157 | 17 |
| David Lewis (1979a) “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se” | 123 | 33 |
| David Lewis (1979b) “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow” | 121 | 38 |
| Graham Priest (1979) “The Logic of Paradox” | 99 | 16 |
| John Perry (1979) “The Problem of the Essential Indexical” | 86 | 61 |
| John McDowell (1979) “Virtue and Reason” | 46 | 13 |
| William K. Rowe (1979) “Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” | 35 | 4 |
| Norman Daniels (1979) “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics” | 33 | 41 |
| Robert Merrihew Adams (1979) “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity” | 28 | 19 |
| Susan K. Mills and John H. Beatty (1979) “The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness” | 27 | 13 |
| … | ||
| Nancy Cartwright (1979) “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies” | 25 | 29 |
| Daniel Lascar and Bruno Poizat (1979) “Introduction To Forking” | 0 | 23 |
| Tyler Burge (1979a) “Semantical Paradox” | 13 | 20 |
| David Lewis (1979c) “Prisoners-Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem” | 7 | 19 |
| Tyler Burge (1979b) “Sinning Against Frege” | 7 | 19 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1978) “Truth in Fiction” | 62 | 18 |
| Harry G. Frankfurt (1978) “The Problem of Action” | 31 | 7 |
| David L. Hull (1978) “A Matter of Individuality” | 30 | 16 |
| Kendall L. Walton (1978) “Fearing Fictions” | 27 | 22 |
| Mark Steiner (1978) “Mathematical Explanation” | 24 | 5 |
| Stephen P. Stich (1978b) “Beliefs and Subdoxastic States” | 24 | 4 |
| Paul R. Thagard (1978) “The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice” | 21 | 9 |
| Peter Railton (1978) “Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation” | 14 | 6 |
| RN Brandon (1978) “Adaptation and Evolutionary Theory” | 14 | 7 |
| Hartry Field (1978) “Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization” | 14 | 6 |
| C Diamond (1978) “Eating Meat and Eating People” | 14 | 2 |
| … | ||
| Jaegwon Kim (1978) “Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables” | 0 | 33 |
| Gregory S. Kavka (1978) “Some Paradoxes of Deterrence” | 1 | 20 |
| Terrence Horgan (1978) “Case Against Events” | 2 | 17 |
| Laurence BonJour (1978) “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” | 7 | 17 |
| Alvin I. Goldman (1978) “Epistemics: Regulative Theory of Cognition” | 2 | 16 |
| Alvin Plantinga (1978) “Boethian Compromise” | 1 | 14 |
| Stephen P. Stich (1978a) “Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis” | 4 | 14 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Stephen L. Darwall (1977) “Two Kinds of Respect” | 107 | 2 |
| Fred Dretske (1977) “Laws of Nature” | 56 | 17 |
| Christopher Boorse (1977) “Health as a Theoretical Concept” | 51 | 3 |
| John M. Taurek (1977) “Should the Numbers Count?” | 50 | 12 |
| Michael Tooley (1977) “Nature of Laws” | 50 | 14 |
| John Perry (1977) “Frege on Demonstratives” | 48 | 32 |
| Peter van Inwagen (1977) “Creatures of Fiction” | 38 | 7 |
| Roderick M. Chisholm and TD Feehan (1977) “Intent To Deceive” | 26 | 1 |
| Amartya Sen (1977) “Rational Fools: Critique of Behavioral Foundations of Economic-Theory” | 17 | 7 |
| Kit Fine (1977) “Properties, Propositions and Sets” | 14 | 5 |
| … | ||
| Tyler Burge (1977) “Belief De Re” | 12 | 33 |
| Hector-Neri Castañeda (1977) “Perception, Belief, and Structure of Physical Objects and Consciousness” | 0 | 27 |
| Hartry Field (1977) “Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role” | 6 | 21 |
| D Lyons (1977) “Human-Rights and General Welfare” | 0 | 14 |
| Bas C. van Fraassen (1977) “Pragmatics of Explanation” | 7 | 13 |
| Frank Jackson (1977) “Causal Theory of Counterfactuals” | 8 | 13 |
| Isaac Levi (1977) “Direct Inference” | 4 | 12 |
| G Hellman and Frank Wilson Thompson (1977) “Physicalist Materialism” | 2 | 12 |
| I Kalantari and A Retzlaff (1977) “Maximal Vector-Spaces Under Automorphisms of Lattice of Recursively Enumerable Vector-Spaces” | 0 | 12 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Alvin I. Goldman (1976) “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge” | 121 | 45 |
| David Lewis (1976b) “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities” | 82 | 29 |
| David Lewis (1976a) “Paradoxes of Time Travel” | 69 | 12 |
| Gilbert Harman (1976) “Practical Reasoning” | 45 | 14 |
| J. Michael Dunn (1976) “Intuitive Semantics for First-Degree Entailments and Coupled Trees” | 41 | 7 |
| Michael Stocker (1976) “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” | 33 | 10 |
| Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976) “Killing, Letting Die, and Trolley Problem” | 31 | 0 |
| Robert C. Stalnaker (1976) “Possible Worlds” | 24 | 10 |
| G. C. Stine (1976) “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure” | 23 | 3 |
| Christopher Boorse (1976) “Wright on Functions” | 21 | 9 |
| … | ||
| William P. Alston (1976b) “Two Types of Foundationalism” | 2 | 16 |
| Robert Merrihew Adams (1976) “Motive Utilitarianism” | 8 | 11 |
| PD Klein (1976) “Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility” | 6 | 11 |
| Brian Loar (1976) “The Semantics of Singular Terms” | 10 | 11 |
| Pavel Tichý (1976) “Verisimilitude Redefined” | 9 | 10 |
| William P. Alston (1976a) “Has Foundationalism Been Refuted” | 1 | 10 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Saul Kripke (1975) “Outline of a Theory of Truth” | 133 | 48 |
| Robert Cummins (1975) “Functional Analysis” | 101 | 17 |
| Robert C. Stalnaker (1975) “Indicative Conditionals” | 55 | 3 |
| Gary Watson (1975) “Free Agency” | 53 | 20 |
| Allan Gibbard (1975) “Contingent Identity” | 29 | 5 |
| Gilbert Harman (1975) “Moral Relativism Defended” | 27 | 14 |
| BF Chellas (1975) “Basic Conditional Logic” | 21 | 4 |
| J Rachels (1975) “Why Privacy is Important” | 19 | 0 |
| Christopher Boorse (1975) “Distinction Between Disease and Illness” | 16 | 4 |
| FR Berger (1975) “Gratitude” | 15 | 3 |
| Judith Jarvis Thomson (1975) “Right To Privacy” | 15 | 6 |
| Jaako Hintikka (1975) “Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated” | 15 | 4 |
| … | ||
| Geoffrey Paul Hellman and Frank Wilson Thompson (1975) “Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction” | 4 | 19 |
| David Kaplan (1975) “Sets, Concepts and Extensions: How To Russell a Frege-Church” | 10 | 15 |
| Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp Jr., and Nuel D. Belnap Jr. (1975) “A Pro-Sentential Theory of Truth” | 11 | 14 |
| RM Hare (1975) “Abortion and Golden Rule” | 4 | 12 |
| P. S. Greenspan (1975) “Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives” | 8 | 12 |
| A Nehamas (1975) “Plato on Imperfection of Sensible World” | 1 | 11 |
| D Nute (1975) “Counterfactuals and Similarity of Words” | 10 | 11 |
| T Regan (1975) “The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism” | 1 | 11 |
| RL Trammell (1975) “Saving Life and Taking Life” | 1 | 11 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Thomas Nagel (1974) “What is It Like To Be a Bat” | 171 | 16 |
| Michael Friedman (1974) “Explanation and Scientific Understanding” | 56 | 11 |
| Isaac Levi (1974) “On Indeterminate Probabilities” | 37 | 15 |
| Keith S. Donnellan (1974) “Speaking of Nothing” | 23 | 19 |
| Charles Parsons (1974) “The Liar Paradox” | 18 | 10 |
| Kit Fine (1974) “Models for Entailment” | 16 | 2 |
| John Earman (1974) “Attempt To Add a Little Direction To Problem of Direction of Time” | 12 | 6 |
| Peter Singer (1974) “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium” | 12 | 9 |
| RB Desousa (1974) “Good and True” | 12 | 0 |
| RI Goldblatt (1974) “Semantic Analysis of Orthologic” | 9 | 7 |
| … | ||
| Michael Devitt (1974) “Singular Terms” | 5 | 25 |
| Terence Parsons (1974) “A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics” | 5 | 17 |
| N. L. Wilson (1974) “Facts, Events and Their Identity Conditions” | 4 | 15 |
| M Swain (1974) “Epistemic Defeasibility” | 6 | 13 |
| Tyler Burge (1974) “Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and Truth” | 3 | 12 |
| Hartry Field (1974) “Quine and Correspondence Theory” | 4 | 12 |
| Louis E. Loeb (1974) “Causal Theories and Causal Overdetermination” | 0 | 11 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1973) “Causation” | 145 | 44 |
| Paul Benacerraf (1973) “Mathematical Truth” | 69 | 27 |
| Larry Wright (1973) “Functions” | 67 | 13 |
| Hilary Putnam (1973) “Meaning and Reference” | 39 | 39 |
| Tyler Burge (1973) “Reference and Proper Names” | 23 | 16 |
| J Narveson (1973) “Moral Problems of Population” | 19 | 3 |
| Michael Walzer (1973) “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands” | 19 | 5 |
| Barbara Hall Partee (1973) “Some Structural Analogies Between Tenses and Pronouns in English” | 15 | 6 |
| TE Hill (1973) “Servility and Self-Respect” | 15 | 6 |
| Robert Audi (1973) “Intending” | 14 | 8 |
| Hartry Field (1973) “Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference” | 14 | 21 |
| … | ||
| Jaegwon Kim (1973) “Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event” | 8 | 31 |
| Elie Zahar (1973b) “Why Did Einstein’s Programme Supersede Lorentz’s (I)” | 8 | 19 |
| Bas C. Van Fraassen (1973) “Values and the Heart’s Command” | 4 | 16 |
| Elie Zahar (1973a) “Why Did Einstein’s Programme Supersede Lorentz’s .2.” | 1 | 13 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Peter Singer (1972) “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” | 132 | 5 |
| Philippa Foot (1972) “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” | 34 | 15 |
| Alasdair Urquhart (1972) “Semantics for Relevant Logics” | 20 | 4 |
| Richard Routley and Robert K. Meyer (1972b) “The Semantics of Entailment — II” | 18 | 3 |
| Thomas Scanlon (1972) “Theory of Freedom of Expression” | 14 | 4 |
| Hartry Field (1972) “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” | 12 | 29 |
| Fred Dretske (1972) “Contrastive Statements” | 12 | 11 |
| Richard Routley and Robert K. Meyer (1972a) “Semantics of Entailment .3.” | 12 | 3 |
| Thompson Clarke (1972) “The Legacy of Skepticism” | 10 | 5 |
| Ned Block and Jerry A. Fodor (1972) “What Psychological States Are Not” | 10 | 11 |
| … | ||
| Richard Rorty (1972) “The World Well Lost” | 0 | 21 |
| Robert L. Causey (1972) “Attribute-Identities in Microreductions” | 0 | 18 |
| AW Wood (1972) “Marxian Critique of Justice” | 4 | 13 |
| John Perry (1972) “Can the Self Divide?” | 9 | 12 |
| Marshall Swain (1972) “Knowledge, Causality, and Justification” | 0 | 11 |
| Michael Teitelman (1972) “The Limits of Individualism” | 0 | 11 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Harry G. Frankfurt (1971) “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” | 128 | 34 |
| Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971a) “A Defense of Abortion” | 71 | 19 |
| David Lewis (1971a) “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies” | 32 | 9 |
| Derek Parfit (1971) “Personal Identity” | 30 | 16 |
| George Boolos (1971) “The Iterative Conception of Set” | 26 | 4 |
| Daniel C. Dennett (1971) “Intentional Systems” | 24 | 19 |
| David Lewis (1971b) “Immodest Inductive Methods” | 21 | 2 |
| Dana Scott (1971) “On Engendering an Illusion of Understanding” | 13 | 2 |
| Thomas Nagel (1971) “The Absurd” | 12 | 1 |
| Peter Unger (1971) “Defense of Skepticism” | 9 | 5 |
| R. Eugene Bales (1971) “Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure” | 9 | 1 |
| … | ||
| Alvin I. Goldman (1971) “The Individuation of Action” | 5 | 17 |
| J. T. Baldwin and A. H. Lachlan (1971) “On Strongly Minimal Sets” | 2 | 16 |
| Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971b) “The Time of a Killing” | 8 | 14 |
| Peter D. Klein (1971) “A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge” | 8 | 13 |
| William G. Lycan (1971) “Noninductive Evidence: Recent Work on Wittgensteins Criteria” | 0 | 9 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Fred Dretske (1970) “Epistemic Operators” | 91 | 3 |
| David Lewis (1970) “How To Define Theoretical Terms” | 67 | 5 |
| Kendall L. Walton (1970) “Categories of Art” | 51 | 4 |
| Keith S. Donnellan (1970) “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions” | 27 | 5 |
| Sydney Shoemaker (1970) “Persons and Their Pasts” | 25 | 3 |
| Robert C. Stalnaker (1970) “Probability and Conditionals” | 24 | 6 |
| V Held (1970) “Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible” | 19 | 2 |
| B Williams (1970) “Self and Future” | 17 | 5 |
| Bas C. van Fraassen (1970) “On Extension of Beths Semantics of Physical Theories” | 10 | 8 |
| AC Baier (1970) “Act and Intent” | 9 | 7 |
| … | ||
| Willard van Orman Quine (1970) “On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation” | 8 | 16 |
| Richard Rorty (1970) “Incorrigibility as Mark of Mental” | 3 | 11 |
| JA Winnie (1970a) “Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions .2.” | 1 | 9 |
| John Perry (1970) “Same F” | 2 | 9 |
| JA Winnie (1970b) “Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions (I)” | 2 | 8 |
| IA Omer (1970) “On D-N Model of Scientific Explanation” | 0 | 8 |
| Roderick M. Chisholm (1970) “Structure of Intention” | 1 | 7 |
| Ernest Sosa (1970) “Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De-Re” | 6 | 7 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Harry G. Frankfurt (1969) “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” | 142 | 4 |
| H. P. Grice (1969) “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” | 22 | 10 |
| Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson Jr. (1969) “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief” | 22 | 12 |
| J. P. Day (1969) “Hope” | 22 | 2 |
| Bas C. van Fraassen (1969) “Facts and Tautological Entailments” | 21 | 4 |
| W Sellars (1969) “Language as Thought and as Communication” | 11 | 4 |
| D Henrich (1969) “Proof-Structure of Kants Transcendental Deduction” | 9 | 1 |
| J. A. Goguen (1969) “The Logic of Inexact Concepts” | 8 | 2 |
| G Vlastos (1969) “Reasons and Causes in Phaedo” | 7 | 7 |
| George Dickie (1969) “Defining Art” | 7 | 4 |
| … | ||
| Jon Barwise (1969b) “Infinitary Logic and Admissible Sets” | 1 | 15 |
| JCE Dekker (1969) “Countable Vector Spaces With Recursive Operations .I.” | 0 | 9 |
| Terence Parsons (1969) “Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic” | 1 | 9 |
| Hector-Neri Castañeda (1969) “Ought, Value, and Utilitarianism” | 0 | 8 |
| Jon Barwise (1969a) “Applications of Strict Pi1/1 Predicates To Infinitary Logic” | 0 | 6 |
| D Bennett (1969) “Essential Properties” | 1 | 6 |
| Donald Davidson (1969) “True To Facts” | 4 | 6 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| David Lewis (1968) “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic” | 36 | 8 |
| Sydney Shoemaker (1968) “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness” | 31 | 1 |
| Barry Stroud (1968) “Transcendental Arguments” | 19 | 9 |
| Peter Unger (1968) “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge” | 18 | 10 |
| Joel Feinberg (1968) “Collective Responsibility” | 18 | 1 |
| Willard van Orman Quine (1968) “Ontological Relativity” | 17 | 4 |
| Norman Malcolm (1968) “Conceivability of Mechanism” | 12 | 5 |
| Hector-Neri Castañeda (1968) “Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge To Others” | 11 | 7 |
| Gilbert Harman (1968) “Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation” | 10 | 12 |
| JF Hanna (1968) “Explication of Explication” | 10 | 2 |
| WS Cooper (1968) “Propositional Logic of Ordinary Discourse” | 10 | 1 |
| Herbert Morris (1968) “Persons and Punishment” | 10 | 3 |
| … | ||
| Bas C. van Fraassen (1968) “Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference” | 5 | 16 |
| Carl G. Hempel (1968) “Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation” | 1 | 9 |
| James W. Cornman (1968) “Elimination of Sensations and Sensations” | 1 | 8 |
| G Kreisel (1968) “A Survey of Proof Theory” | 2 | 7 |
| K Kunen (1968) “Implicit Definability and Infinitary Languages” | 0 | 6 |
| BA Brody (1968) “Confirmation and Explanation” | 0 | 6 |
| B Hansson (1968) “Choice Structures and Preference Relations” | 3 | 6 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Alvin I. Goldman (1967) “A Causal Theory of Knowing” | 52 | 16 |
| Donald Davidson (1967b) “Truth and Meaning” | 36 | 16 |
| Hilary Putnam (1967b) “Time and Physical Geometry” | 28 | 4 |
| Donald Davidson (1967a) “Causal Relations” | 25 | 17 |
| Ian Hacking (1967a) “Possibility” | 18 | 3 |
| Ian Hacking (1967b) “Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability” | 17 | 4 |
| JM Hinton (1967) “Visual Experiences” | 16 | 1 |
| Hilary Putnam (1967a) “Mathematics Without Foundations” | 16 | 5 |
| J Narveson (1967) “Utilitarianism and New Generations” | 14 | 3 |
| Peter T. Geach (1967a) “Identity” | 11 | 8 |
| Peter T. Geach (1967b) “Intentional Identity” | 11 | 4 |
| … | ||
| Hector-Neri Castañeda (1967) “Indicators and Quasi-Indicators” | 8 | 12 |
| Brian Ellis and Peter Bowman (1967) “Conventionality in Distant Simulataneity” | 0 | 11 |
| Brian Skyrms (1967) “Explication of X Knows That P” | 1 | 9 |
| RL Martin (1967) “Toward a Solution To The Liar Paradox” | 0 | 7 |
| Kenneth F. Schaffner (1967) “Approaches To Reduction” | 8 | 6 |
| Nuel D. Belnap Jr. (1967) “Intensional Models for First Degree Formulas” | 1 | 5 |
| WW Tait (1967) “Intensional Interpretations of Functionals of Finite Type I” | 4 | 5 |
| AI Fine (1967) “Consistency, Derivability, and Scientific Change” | 0 | 5 |
| GC Maccallum (1967) “Negative and Positive Freedom” | 3 | 5 |
| K Nielsen (1967) “Wittgensteinian Fideism” | 4 | 5 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Keith S. Donnellan (1966) “Reference and Definite Descriptions” | 48 | 21 |
| C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher (1966) “Remembering” | 46 | 3 |
| David Lewis (1966) “An Argument for the Identity Theory” | 36 | 2 |
| Storrs McCall (1966) “Connexive Implication” | 22 | 3 |
| Roderick M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa (1966) “Logic of Intrinsically Better” | 16 | 9 |
| Bas C. van Fraassen (1966) “Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic” | 15 | 8 |
| CW Rietdijk (1966) “A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity” | 13 | 3 |
| Jaegwon Kim (1966) “On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory” | 10 | 6 |
| E. J. Lemmon (1966a) “Algebraic Semantics for Modal Logics 2” | 6 | 5 |
| JL Austin (1966) “Three Ways of Spilling Ink” | 6 | 0 |
| … | ||
| E. J. Lemmon (1966b) “Algebraic Semantics for Modal Logics .I.” | 3 | 6 |
| N Rescher (1966) “Logic of Chronological Propositions” | 1 | 6 |
| JR Shoenfield (1966) “A Theorem on Minimal Degrees” | 0 | 5 |
| RC Jeffrey (1966) “Goodmans Query” | 0 | 5 |
| H Smokler (1966) “Goodmans Paradox and Problem of Rules of Acceptance” | 0 | 5 |
| Article | 2020-2024 | First 10 Years |
|---|---|---|
| Paul Benacerraf (1965) “What Numbers Could Not Be” | 59 | 5 |
| Peter T. Geach (1965) “Assertion” | 48 | 2 |
| Gilbert Harman (1965) “The Inference To the Best Explanation” | 38 | 10 |
| J. L. Mackie (1965) “Causes and Conditions” | 28 | 9 |
| Frank Sibley (1965) “Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic” | 25 | 1 |
| Joel Feinberg (1965) “The Expressive Function of Punishment” | 20 | 1 |
| L Wittgenstein (1965) “Wittgenstein Lecture on Ethics (I) a Lecture on Ethics” | 12 | 1 |
| David L. Hull (1965) “The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy: 2000 Years of Stasis (I)” | 10 | 0 |
| Richard Rorty (1965) “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories” | 9 | 21 |
| AC Danto (1965) “Basic Actions” | 9 | 5 |
| … | ||
| Paul K. Feyerabend (1965) “On the Meaning of Scientific Terms” | 1 | 7 |
| Thomas Nagel (1965) “Physicalism” | 3 | 7 |
| P Achinstein (1965) “The Problem of Theoretical Terms” | 0 | 6 |
| JA Shaffer (1965) “Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem” | 0 | 5 |
| CS Chihara and Jerry A. Fodor (1965) “Operationalism and Ordinary Language a Critique of Wittgenstein” | 2 | 5 |
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